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Introduction 
Richard Bloomfield made $424,000 in connection with Plaintiffs' purchase of 
securities. At trial, Mr. Bloomfield did not dispute that he made $424,000 from the 
transaction or that he was unlicensed to sell securities. The sole issue for the jury to decide 
was whether Mr. Bloomfield "offered to sale" the securities Plaintiffs purchased. Plaintiffs 
and Mr. Bloomfield disagreed on a proper jury instruction defining the meaning of "sale" 
or "offered to sale" for purposes of determining liability under the Utah Securities Act. 
Mr. Bloomfield's proposed jury instruction included a list of misleading and 
irrelevant factors that the jury was told they "may" consider in deciding whether Mr. 
Bloomfield offered or sold the security. Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction quoted the 
definition of"sale" and "offered to sale" straight from the Utah Securities Act's definition. 
The trial court adopted all of Mr. Bloomfield's proposed jury instructions and 
rejected all of Plaintiffs' proposed jury instructions, without explanation or meaningful oral 
argument. Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to ameliorate the damage caused by the trial court's 
decision to adopt the erroneous instruction by asking the trial court to add a limiting 
statement to the jury instruction. 
Given the jury instruction read to the jury, it was no surprise to anyone that the jury 
found that Mr. Bloomfield did not sale or offer to sale a security to Plaintiffs. 
{00024676 1 } 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Argument 
Mr. Bloomfield makes four arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs' appeal of the trial 
court's decision to erroneously instruct the jury on the definition of sale or offer to sale 
under the Utah Securities Act: (1) that the standard of review is abuse of discretion, (2) 
Plaintiffs failed to preserve the issue by attempting to ameliorate the harm caused by the 
trial court's error, (3) that the jury instruction was not error, and ( 4) Plaintiffs suffered no 
prejudice. Plaintiffs address each of these arguments in turn below. 
1. The Standard of Review is For Correctness Because the Trial Court Gave an 
Instruction But That Instruction Misstated the Law. 
When a jury instruction is given, this Court's review of whether the instruction 
correctly states the law presents a question oflaw, which this Court reviews for correctness. 
See State v. Miller, 2008 UT 61, ,r 13, 193 P.3d 92 ("Whether a jury instruction correctly 
states the law presents a question of law which we review for correctness."). "Challenges 
to jury instructions require interpretations of law; therefore, we review them for 
correctness." Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ,r 22, 221 P .3d 
256. In applying this standard, the reviewing court gives no deference to the district court. 
See State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ,r 16,243 P.3d 1250. 
Mr. Bloomfield argues the standard is abuse of discretion but cites to cases applying 
an abuse of discretion standard when a trial court refuses to give an instruction. See 
Bloomfield Reply Brief, 38 (quoting Miller v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2012 UT 54, ,r 13 
285 P.3d 1208 (noting that the issue presented in that case was "a district court's refusal to 
give a jury instruction"). 
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Here, a jury instruction was given. This is not a case in which the district court 
refused to give an instruction. Instead, the issue in this case is whether the jury instruction 
that was given correctly states the law. Accordingly, the standard of review is for 
correctness. 
2. Plaintiffs Preserved Their Objection to the Jury Instruction by Making a 
Written Objection and Submitting a Proposed Alternative Instruction. 
2.1 Plaintiffs Objected to the Inclusion of the Irrelevant Factors. 
Mr. Bloomfield suggests that Plaintiffs failed to preserve their objections, both legal 
and factual, to the erroneous jury instruction even though Plaintiffs submitted a proposed 
alternative instruction and submitted a written objection to Mr. Bloomfield's proposed 
instruction. 
In Plaintiffs' written objection to Mr. Bloomfield's proposed Jury Instruction No. 
13, Plaintiffs explain that their proposed jury instruction is consistent with the statutory 
definitions of "off er" and "sale" under the Utah Securities Act. R. 6294 (noting that the 
language in Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction "is consistent with the statutory definitions 
of an 'offer' and 'sale' under the Utah Uniform Securities Act"). 
Plaintiffs continued to object by taking issue with Mr. Bloomfield's inclusion of 
additional explanations and a list of misleading factors in his proposed jury instruction, 
none of which are found in the statutory definition of "offer" or "sale." Plaintiffs stated in 
their written objection that the inclusion of a list of misleading and irrelevant factors with 
no application to this case erroneously narrows the scope of the legal definitions of off er 
and sale under the Utah Securities Act: 
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The statutory definitions of off er or sale are not intended to be construed so 
narrowly and could encompass virtually a limitless number of factors based on the 
unique facts and circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to 
include this list of factors in the jury instruction. 
R. 6294. 
Plaintiffs' objection was clear: Plaintiffs objected to Mr. Bloomfield's proposed jury 
instruction because it was legally erroneous in that it narrowed the statutory definition of 
the terms "offer" and "sale" by including a list of factors not included in the statutory 
definition that had no application to the facts in this case. Further, Plaintiffs' objection to 
Mr. Bloomfield's instruction was clear when Plaintiffs submitted an alternative instruction 
that tracked the statutory definitions of "off er" and "sale" and asked the court to adopt 
Plaintiffs' instruction. R. 6294. 
2.2 Plaintiffs Cited Fed. Sav. & Loan for the Proposition That a Seller 
Directly Participates in Soliciting the Plaintiff's Purchase. 
Plaintiffs also objected that Mr. Bloomfield's proposed instruction was factually 
misleading, confusing, and prejudicial to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs objected that Mr. 
Bloomfield's proposed instruction was "full of information that is so clearly slanted in 
Defendants' favor that it would be unduly prejudicial to include it in the instructions to the 
jury." R. 6294. Plaintiffs continued with their objection by arguing that the list of factors 
Mr. Bloomfield included in his proposed instruction "are completely detached from the 
facts of this case. Because none of these factors are factually applicable, a jury may be 
confused and believe that the Bloomfield Defendants did not offer or sale the securities to 
Plaintiffs because none of these factors are factually relevant." R. 6294. 
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Mr. Bloomfield misleadingly claims that Plaintiffs' reference to a federal district 
court case, Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405 (D. 
Utah 1987) ("Fed. Sav. & Loan"), at the bottom of their proposed jury instruction, means 
that Plaintiffs agreed, despite express objections to the contrary, that the list of factors 
included in Mr. Bloomfield's proposed instruction were appropriate. See Reply Br. 40 
("Plaintiffs cited in support of their proposed instruction the very case they now claim is 
the source of the errors."). 
This argument is disingenuous, misleading and misconstrues the purpose for which 
Plaintiffs cited the case. In Fed Sav. & Loan, the court discussed whether a person was a 
seller under federal securities laws. Because the Tenth Circuit had not addressed the issue, 
the court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. In one case analyzed by the Utah 
District Court, "the defendants had helped draft the Prospectus, participated in 'road show' 
presentations of information to securities brokers and investment analysts, analyzed the 
mar~et and set the price of Activision shares, and negotiated the agreement with the 
underwriters." See Fed. Sav. & Loan, 664 F. Supp. at 1411 (quoting In re Activision 
Securities Litigation, 621 F. Supp. 415, 521 (N.D. Cal. 1985)). Those activities-
participation in road shows, drafting a prospectus, setting the market price-were the 
activities Mr. Bloomfield incorporated into his proposed jury instruction as factors the 
jurors should consider in deciding whether a person offered or sold a security. 
But the Activision court had found those factors irrelevant to a determination of who 
was a seller. The Utah District Court noted that the Activision court "distinguished the 
above activities from other cases where a defendant had met personally with investors and 
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had spoken at broker-dealer seminars." Id The take away from Fed Sav. & Loan is that 
the important factor for determining seller liability is whether a defendant met personally 
with investors, not whether a defendant engaged in activities such as participating in road 
shows, setting the market price, or drafting a prospectus. 
Plaintiffs' reference to Federal Sav. & Loan in their proposed jury instruction was 
to support the inclusion of the last sentence of Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction: "For a 
person other than the person who actually transfers title in the stock to qualify as a seller 
or offeror, that person must actively and directly participate in soliciting a person's 
purchase of the security." R 6239. 
Compare the last sentence in Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction to the holding of 
the Utah District Court in Federal Sav. & Loan: "we rule that 'seller' status for§ 12(2) will 
exist as to the person who transfers title to the stock and such additional persons who 
actually and directly participate in soliciting a plaintiffs purchase." Fed. Sav. & Loan, 664 
F. Supp. at 1411 The statements are the same. It is clear Plaintiffs cited Federal Sav. & 
Loan for its holding and not to support a list of inapplicable factors that Plaintiffs did not 
include in their proposed jury instruction and that they objected to in Mr. Bloomfield's 
proposed instruction. 
2.3 Plaintiffs Did Not Waive Their Objections by Attempting to Ameliorate 
the Harm Caused When the District Court Adopted an Errant Jury 
Instruction. 
Mr. Bloomfield also argues that Plaintiffs did not preserve their objections once the 
district court made a modification to the jury instruction that did not remove the offending 
list of misleading and irrelevant factors. R. 8865. Once the court had decided to adopt the 
{ 00024676 l } 10 
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erroneous instruction and left all of the offending language in the jury instruction, 
Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to ameliorate the harm of the erroneous decision by asking 
the court to include additional language in the instruction that the list of misleading and 
irrelevant factors should not be given equal weight. R. 8866. 
This Court's decisions in similar circumstances support Plaintiffs' counsel's attempt 
to ameliorate the damage caused by the trial court's error. For example, this Court has held 
that a party does not waive an objection to inadmissible evidence when the objecting party 
attempts to ameliorate the damage caused by that evidence during cross-examination. "A 
party does not evince a distinct intent to waive his objection to improperly admitted 
evidence by attempting to ameliorate the damage caused by that evidence." Wilson v. IHC 
Hosps., Inc., 2012 UT 43, ,r 62, 289 P.3d 369. This Court has stated, "It would be unfair 
for a prosecutor to question a witness on prohibited information or issues, but then require 
the defendant to forego cross-examination, which could ameliorate the damage caused, to 
preserve an objection to the prosecutor's misconduct." State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 334 
(Utah 1991 ). 
Similarly, it would be unfair for this Court to find that Plaintiffs waived their 
objections to the inclusion of a misleading and irrelevant list of factors when, after the court 
decided to allow the list to be included in the jury instruction, Plaintiffs' counsel suggested 
additional language to ameliorate the damage caused by the erroneous instruction. 
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3. Jury Instruction 13 was Not a Correct Statement of the Law. 
Mr. Bloomfield argues that the inclusion of misleading and irrelevant factors was 
not error and, in doing so, continues to misrepresent to the court the holding in Federal 
Savings & Loan and Activision. Mr. Bloomfield argues that the factors it included in its 
proposed jury instruction were proper because they "were taken directly from Federal Sav. 
& Loan." Reply Br. at 48. Mr. Bloomfield points to the fact that Plaintiffs referenced the 
case in its proposed jury instructions but fails to explain the holding in the case or explain 
why Plaintiffs referenced the case. 
3.1 Federal Sav. & Loan Stands for the Proposition that a Seller Is Actively 
and Directly Involved in Soliciting a Person's Purchase. 
Plaintiffs' reference to Federal Sf!,V. & Loan was to support the inclusion of the last 
sentence of Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction: "For a person other than the person who 
actually transfers title in the stock to qualify as a seller or offeror, that person must actively 
and directly participate in soliciting a person's purchase of the secwity." R 6239. Plaintiffs 
did not reference Federal Sav. & Loan for any other reason but the holding of the case, 
which support Plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction. 
The factors erroneously included in the jury instruction were found in Federal Sav. 
& Loan. But, the Utah District Court found those factors to be irrelevant in determining 
seller liability and so did the court in Activision. Moreover, the Federal Sav. & Loan 
decision provides no basis to include factors in a jury instruction that have nothing to do 
with the facts in the case to be decided by the jury. Mr. Bloomfield's treatment of the 
decision in Federal Sav. & Loan is grossly misleading; a review of the holding in the case, 
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and the Activision case relied on by the Utah District Court, demonstrate that the factors to 
which Plaintiffs objected and to which they object here on appeal are irrelevant to a 
determination of whether a person offered or sold a security. 
A discussion of the case demonstrates that it cannot support the inclusion of the list 
of factors in the jury instruction. Federal Sav. & Loan was a ruling on a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. Federal Savings & Loan was a shareholder of an entity that 
agreed to pay the principal of bonds that were issued to pay costs to build a hotel if the 
bonds entered default. The bonds went into default and the lawsuit ensued. Federal Savings 
& Loan sued, among others, a bank, Mercantile Bank National Association ("Mercantile"), 
that acted as a trustee for the bonds and drafted and reviewed documents necessary for the 
issuance of the bonds. 
Federal Savings & Loan also sued a company, The Marling Group ("Marling"), that 
was hired to conduct a market and feasibility analysis for the hotel, which analysis Marling 
knew would be used to obtain financing. Federal Savings &- Loan sued both Mercantile 
and Marling for violation of§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and for violation of the 
Utah Securities Act. 
Both Mercantile and Marling filed motions to dismiss the claims against them under 
12(b)(6) for violation of§ 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and for violation of the Utah 
Securities Act for failure to state a claim. The Utah District Court analyzed who could be 
a seller under both federal and state securities laws. The court noted that the Tenth Circuit 
had not addressed the scope of persons potentially liable for violating§ 12(2) so it looked 
to other jurisdictions for guidance. 
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3.2 The List of Factors Taken from Activision Are Not Determinative of 
Whether Someone is a Seller. 
The case that the Utah District Court found persuasive was In re Activision. In 
Activision, shareholders who purchased shares of stock in a public offering that declined 
significantly in value shortly after the public offering, filed claims under§ 12(2) against 
corporate officers and directors of Activision, among others. Activision's corporate 
officers and directors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that they were not 
sellers of the securities. The allegations against these corporate officers and directors were 
that they engaged in some of the conduct which was the conduct included in the list of 
factors in Jury Instruction 13 in this case: "planning the offering, drafting the prospectus, 
and negotiating the price of the stock." 621 F. Supp. at 420. The court granted the motion 
to dismiss, holding that those activities were not relevant to a determination of seller status 
because those activities "were merely typical of what any corporation and its officers would 
engage in prior to a public offering." Id. 
The Activision court granted the shareholders an opportunity to amend their 
complaint to provide other allegations to support their claims that the corporate officers 
and directors offered or sold securities. The shareholders amended their complaint to allege 
that "defendants helped draft the Prospectus, participated in 'road show' presentations of 
information to securities brokers and investment analysts, analyzed the market and set the 
price for Activision shares, and negotiated the agreement with the underwriters." Id. at 421. 
This is the same list of activities that the jury in this case was told they "may" 
consider in determining if Mr. Bloomfield was a seller. But the Activision court held that 
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even if the defendants engaged in all of those activities, "they are inadequate to impose 
liability under 12(2)." Id. . Those activities had no bearing whatsoever on whether the 
corporate officers and directors were sellers. In other words, the factors that the district 
court instructed the jury here to consider had no factual basis in this case and, in any event, 
had been found legally insufficient to determine liability anyway. 
The Activision court distinguished cases cited by the shareholders where officers 
and directors were found to be sellers because, in those cases, the defendants "met 
personally with investors and spoke at broker-dealer seminars." Id. (citing Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980)). Or the defendants 
"travelled to Florida to find the original subscribers for the corporation [ and] personally 
instructed these individuals as to how to solicit additional investors." Id. (citing Hill York 
Corp. v. Am. Int'! Fran., Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
The court explained that the test to determine seller status "has to be predicated on 
actual participation in the selling process." Id. This determination, the court noted, is made 
"on a case-by-case basis." Id. 
The Activision court granted the corporate officers and directors' second motion to 
dismiss because none of the alleged conduct, which was the conduct the trial court told the 
jurors the may consider in Jury Instruction 13, were relevant to the determination of seller 
liability. 
{ 00024676 I } 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3.3 The Utah District Court's Adoption of the Activision Position Is Not a 
Basis for Including the Factors in the Jury Instructions. 
The Utah District Court adopted the position taken by the court in Activision that 
"seller status has to be predicated on actual participation in the selling process" and noted 
that the Activision court "distinguished the above activities [ which form the list of factors 
included in Jury Instruction 13] from other cases where a defendant had met personally 
with investors." Fed. Savings & Loan, 664 F. Supp. at 1411. 
The Utah District Court then turned to the alleged conduct of Mercantile and 
Marsing. The court noted that the alleged conduct by Mercantile was limited to drafting 
and reviewing documents necessary to issue the bonds. Id. at 1412. The court then granted 
Mercantile's motion to dismiss because simply drafting and reviewing documents is not 
sufficient to show that it directly participated in the sale of securities. Id. 
The court also granted Marling's motion to dismiss because the allegation that it 
provided professional services to do a market and feasibility analysis was insufficient to 
make it a direct solicitor of the purchase of the securities. Id. 
3.4 Application of Decisions Cited by Bloomfield to This Case. 
In this case, the trial court instructed the jurors that they "may" consider factors that 
are not ever applicable in determining whether a person sold securities. The Activision 
court held that even if a person engages in all of the activities included in the factors Mr. 
Bloomfield inserted into his proposed Jury Instruction, which became Instruction 13, that 
person still would not necessarily be considered a seller. These factors cannot be 
considered a "guide" to the jury, as Mr. Bloomfield suggests, when none of the conduct 
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included in the list of factors can ever, as a matter of law, support a finding of seller 
liability. They are also not a "guide" where they are a confusing list of conduct that has 
nothing to do with the evidence adduced in the trial the jury attended. The trial court should 
have never given permission to the jury to choose to consider a list of factors that, either 
individually or in the aggregate, could never support a finding of seller liability. 
4. Plaintiffs Were Harmed by the Jury Instruction. 
Plaintiffs were able to present evidence similar to the evidence in State v. Bo/son, 
2007 UT App 268, 167 P.3d 539: Mr. Bloomfield approached Plaintiffs with the 
investment, Mr. Bloomfield introduced Plaintiffs to the promoter, Mr. Feldman [R. 9219; 
9017-18; 9236; 9275-76; 9457; 9868-70]; Mr. Bloomfield helped Plaintiffs determine how 
much to invest [R. 9057-58; 9287-91; 9463-64; Tr. Ex. 53; R. 9707-08], Mr. Bloomfield 
promised high returns on the investment [R. 9021; 9122-23; 9276; 9401; 9454; 9496; 
9721], Mr. Bloomfield received a substantial commission to convince Plaintiffs to invest 
[R. 9028-29; 9219-23; 9465; 9496-97; 9245], and Mr. Bloomfield was the Plaintiffs' 
primary contact person for information about the investment [R. 9058-59; 9291; 9464; 
9280-81]. Based on the foregoing, ajury could have found that Mr. Bloomfield effectuated 
_the sale of securities to Plaintiffs. And had the factors and exemptions not been listed in 
Jury Instruction No. 13, the jury would have found Defendants liable for selling a security 
without a license, which Mr. Bloomfield admitted to at trial. [R.6235.] 
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Conclusion On Cross-Appeal 
Because the district court erroneously included factually irrelevant factors in Jury 
Instruction No. 13, this Court should reverse the judgment on the Securities Claims and 
grant Plaintiffs a new trial on those causes of action. 
DATED: May 25, 2017 
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